Skater Beagle and the Puzzle of AI Creativity

Generative AI poses a puzzle for copyright lawyers, and many others besides. How can a soulless mechanical process lead to the creation of new expression, seemingly out of nothing, or if not nothing, very little?

This essay will help you understanding where the apparent creativity in generative AI outputs comes from, why a lot of AI works are not copyrightable, and why the outputs of generative AI are mostly very different to the works those AIs were trained on.

Who is the author of Skater Beagle?

The image below was created by one LLM (Google Gemini) using a long prompt written by another LLM (Anthropic’s Claude) following the instruction “draft a prompt for an arresting image of a beagle on skateboard.”

AI generated “arresting image of a beagle on skateboard.” From a low angle, a joyful beagle with ears flying expertly rides a skateboard down a steep urban hill during a cinematic, “golden hour” sunset. A city skyline is backlit by the setting sun.

If I took this photo in real life, I would be recognized as the author. Likewise, if I painted it as a picture. But because the image was created by a process that involved very little direct human contribution, it is uncopyrightable. For many people, this seems odd. How can an image that looks creative not be recognized as copyrightable, just because it was created with AI rather than an iPhone camera, or a set of water-based paints? After all, artists use tools to make art all the time?

No copyright for the AI

The first question to address is whether Google’s image generation model is the author of Skater Beagle. The answer is no, for many reasons, but let’s focus on the copyright issues, because they are the most interesting.

The AI can’t get copyright protection because the AI itself is not creative in any of the ways we generally understand that term (at least if you are a copyright lawyer) because it lacks any desire or intention to express. In Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony (1884) the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that a photograph could be copyrighted, but only because the photographer’s creative choices made the image an “original intellectual conception[] of the author” rather than a mere mechanical capture. LLMs are impressive, but they don’t have any intentions separate from the math that makes them predict one thing and not another. LLMs don’t have original intellectual conception they are trying to express.

No copyright for the simple prompt engineer

If not the AI, then maybe the person who writes the prompts should be credited with the resulting expression? After all, isn’t choosing the right words in the prompt a creative act?

That doesn’t work either. Sure, choosing the right words in the prompt might be creative in some senses, but copyright law doesn’t protect creativity in the sense of “hey, that’s a good idea,”— it protects creativity that manifests in original expression. This idea-expression distinction is one of the foundations of copyright law. Copyright attaches to the final expression, not the upstream idea or instruction that triggered it. Even if you think my idea to get one LLM to write a prompt for another LLM “for an arresting image of a beagle on skateboard” is creative, its really just a simple idea and nothing copyrightable.

Surely, it must be one or the other?

But still, many would say, if Skater Beagle exhibits all the tell-tale signs of subjective creative authorship, that creativity must come from somewhere. So it’s either the AI or the person who wrote the prompt?

This line of thinking is half right, the generative AI is doing something important, it’s creating something from nothing, but its not “creativity” in the relevant sense. If you want to think of all of the details of the skater-beagle picture as expression, that expression does not magically appear from the ether, it comes from the latent space implied by the training data as processed by the model during training. In some ways it’s fair to say it comes from the collective efforts of all of the authors of all of the works in the training data. But not in the sense of a simple remix or cut-and-paste job.

Not from nothing, but not a remix

Generative AI systems come in different kinds, GANs, diffusion models, multimodal large language models, and more. The common feature of all these systems is that they trained on a large volume of prior works, and through a mathematical process, they are able to produce new works, often with very limited additional human input. But that doesn’t mean Skater Beagle belongs to the millions (10s of millions, 100s of millions?) of authors of the works in the training data. This beagle is not simple remix or collage. Although generative AI models are data dependent, they don’t just remix the training data, they produce genuinely new outputs.

AI Creativity comes from latent space

Generative AI models learn an abstract model of the training data, a model that is in many ways more than the sum of its parts. When you prompt a generative AI model, you are not querying a database, you are navigating a latent space implied by the training data.

What do I mean by “navigating a latent space implied by the training data”? Let’s start with a simple analogy. When you fit a linear regression to a handful of data points you generate a line of best fit implied by the data as seen in the figure below. Think of the dots as the training data and the line as the model implied by the training data.

Illustration of fitting a line to scattered data. Two side-by-side scatter plots on a beige background. Left: Five orange data points scattered in an upward trend without a line. Right: The same points with a straight diagonal line drawn from bottom left to top right, representing a best-fit line. Both axes are labeled X and Y, ranging from 0 to 10.

The line illustrated above is simple, it is in fact an equation that you can use to answer the question, “if y is 6, what is x?” The point 6,6 is not in the data, but it is implied by the data and the model we used to fit the data. When you plug y=6 into the model you are navigating to a point implied by the data that tells you x=6, as seen in the figure below. That is what I mean by navigating the latent space.

Illustration of navigating to point implied by linear regression. A scatter plot with five orange data points, a green dashed diagonal line representing a trend, and red dashed lines intersecting at the point (6,6). Axes are labeled X and Y, ranging from 0 to 10, on a beige background.

But of course, if we used a different model, the data would imply a slightly different latent space, as illustrated in the figure below. Here the model is not linear its quadratic and just changing that starting assumption gives us a different line of best fit.

Illustration of fitting a different model to the data. A scatter plot with five orange data points on a textured blue-and-beige background. A green dashed curve rises steeply before leveling off, intersecting red dashed lines at the point (4,6). Axes are labeled X and Y, ranging from 0 to 10.

The difference between the straight line and the curved line here is analogous to the difference between different LLMs. Obviously, generative AI models are much more complicated than a two-dimensional regression model. Generative AI models have thousands of dimensions, and so they constructs a much richer latent space, but the analogy holds. Any number of dimensions above 3 is hard to conceptualize, don’t bother trying to imagine thousands of dimensions, your brain might melt.

Does Latent Space Solve the Creativity Puzzle?

Understanding latent space helps resolve the creativity puzzle. The image of Skater Beagle looks original because the model has generated a point in a vast space of possible images implied by its training data — not because a human author made free and creative choices about the details. The model navigates to a statistically plausible combination of features, but no person decides where the beagle’s ears should fly, how steep the hill should be, or what the sunset should look like. Understanding latent space helps explain why the output of a model can feel creative but still lacks the human authorship copyright law requires.

But wait, …

But in practice, it seems like almost any photo you send to the Copyright Office will be deemed creative enough to meet the requirements for registration. If I can get copyright for just pointing my iPhone at a beagle on skateboard and pressing a button, why can’t I get copyright in an image of a beagle on skateboard that I created using generative AI?

This seems inconsistent at first blush, but only because the question overlooks the difference between the “thin” copyright that attaches to photos based in reality and the thick copyright that typically attaches to illustrations drawn from imagination.

Small jumps versus big jumps

When you take a photo, you are making a copyrightable selection and arrangement from reality. You get no rights in the underlying reality, just a specific photographic representation therein. In most copyrightable photos there is only a small jump between idea and expression and so the resulting copyright is limited to that jump. Taking a photo does not give you exclusive rights on the underlying ideas, subjects, locations, etc.

There are two critical differences between the typical iPhone snap and an image generated with AI.

The first difference is that there is a much more significant jump between idea and expression in the transition from text prompt to final image, compared to the jump from a real life scene to photo capturing the scene. The second difference is that in photography, a human still makes some minimal creative decisions (framing, timing, composition) that manifest in the look of the resulting image. The human makes the jump, even if it’s only a small jump. In AI generation, the algorithm fills in the details that transform the prompt into a specific visual expression. The AI makes the jump between your idea for a photo and the details of the photo itself.

There is no copyright in the Skater Beagle image Gemini made for me. The work of bridging the gap from abstract concept to concrete image was done entirely by algorithms trained on trillions of words and millions photos. The details that we might think of as expression in the image didn’t come from nothing, they didn’t come directly from any particular photo featuring low angle action shots, beagles, dogs with ears flying, skateboard riders, steep hills, urban settings, “golden hour” sunsets, city skylines, etc. The details that we might think of as expression don’t reflect the free and creative choices of any human mind. They are details implied by a model trained on millions of photos, but those details don’t come from those photos either. The come from the universe of possibilities those photos imply, they come from latent space.

Skater Beagle is an extreme example

Generative AI lets us navigate a latent space implied by works too numerous to count so that we can create genuinely new digital artifacts. I began this essay with the promise that understanding this would shed light on how copyright applies to AI-generated works, but Skater Beagle is an extreme example drawn from one end of the continuum. Understanding why Skater Beagle is not a copy of beagles in the training data, but is also not my creative expression tells us that the Copyright Office is right to deny copyright to some generative AI creations. But it does not tell us at what point a user would cross the line from commissioning editor to guiding hand or creative mastermind. It’s hard to imagine crossing that line with a single text prompt, but it’s easy to see how you would leap over it in an iterative process as in A Single Piece of American Cheese. Iterative interactive use of generative AI will often be an act of authorship, so long as it is more than just choosing a winner in a beauty pageant of AI creations.

[This essay was adapted from Matthew Sag, Copyright Law in the Age of AI (2025)]

Drafting Law School AI Policies

There are a lot of poorly thought through AI policies out there

Law schools are realizing that they need student conduct policies that address generative AI. But after reviewing many of their policies (and some undergrad policies as well), I feel they often miss the mark. Here are five problems that crop up again and again.

First, many conflate using AI with plagiarism.

Plagiarism, properly defined, is the unacknowledged appropriation of another’s words or ideas. Violations of prohibitions on AI use, by contrast, are often better conceptualized as breaches of disclosure obligations, misrepresentation, or general academic integrity violations. While AI misuse can sometimes constitute plagiarism it is not necessarily so. Rules that lump these activities together are too blunt. There are sound reasons, sometimes to prohibit both, but they should not be conflated. Taring a wide set of AI uses with the brush of plagiarism. Is unlikely to win acceptance from students, who will reasonably see such policies as overreach.

Second, definitions are a muddle.

Many policies leave key operative terms—such as “compose,” “proofread,” “substantially edit,” or “small part”—undefined. Absent bright-line rules or illustrative examples, students and faculty are left to infer the policy’s scope, producing inconsistent enforcement and potential due process concerns.

Sweeping prohibitions on “AI use” may unintentionally extend to widely accepted tools, including spellcheckers, grammar correction software, and dictation systems. Such breadth is rarely the drafters’ intent and risks chilling legitimate academic practice. Blanket prohibitions, especially without accommodation mechanisms, may disproportionately disadvantage non-native speakers and students with disabilities who rely on technological assistance, even as comparable human support (e.g., writing centers) remains permissible. If that kind of restriction is intended, it should be express.

Third, some schools are leaning on unreliable technology to police AI use.

Recommendations to use AI detectors or plagiarism software to identify AI-generated work are problematic given their poor reliability. Without cautionary limits, such tools risk false positives and undermine due process.

It is important to understand three key limitations here:

(1) Anti-plagiarism software does not detect novel generative AI outputs;

(2) AI detectors are not reliable in the way anti-plagiarism software are reliable;

(3) AI detectors generate a large percentage of false positives. They are especially prone to do so in cases involving neurodivergent authorship or use of standard proofreading programs such as Grammarly.

Honestly, you would be better off tossing a coin, at least then you would have a realistic assessment of how far you should trust the answer.

Fourth, few schools offer clear ways for students to disclose their use of AI.

Standardized disclosure mechanisms would enhance transparency and promote consistent expectations across courses and instructors.

Fifth, the policies themselves are often inconsistent.

One policy I read takes a categorical approach on prohibiting AI use but then in a latter part of the document it suggests allowing AI “for parts of assignments” and asks instructors to clarify expectations. What?

A template for a better Law School AI policy

So, what should your AI policy look like? It should be clear, specific, comprehensive, and custom tailored for each course you teach. You can do that with the template I suggest below, just by changing the “mays” to “may nots”

I’m sure this is not perfect, but I think it’s a useful place to begin. Your use of this template is not plagiarism, I am posting it here because I think you should copy it.

Generic Law School Syllabus AI Use Policy

(1) The use of generative AI in this course is restricted but not entirely prohibited. The restrictions serve multiple, sometimes overlapping, purposes: preserving pedagogical integrity, preserving the integrity of assessment, helping you avoid plagiarism, misrepresentation, and shoddy work. These restrictions are tailored to this course, so you need to review them carefully.

(2) Key Prohibitions:

(a) In this course you are prohibited from presenting text generated by generative AI as your own in any assessable work product. This means that you may not copy-paste more than 8 consecutive words from any source without specific attribution (superficial changes designed to evade the substance of this rule will be disregarded); you may not present specific insights and ideas from external sources without specific attribution to an appropriate source. In addition, you may not include factual information or citations from generative AI that you have not verified. Work containing obvious AI “hallucinations” of citations or quotations will merit a failing grade.

(b) In addition, you may not use generative AI to develop insights and strategies for specific assigned class activities or assessable work product without specific authorization from your professor. For example, in that context you may not use generative AI

  • to review legal documents (real and simulated) for potential issues where learning to spot relevant issues is part of the skillset being taught;
  • to suggest negotiation strategies for a simulated deal where learning to develop negotiation strategies is part of the skillset being taught;
  • to practice role-playing as opposing counsel for such a simulated deal or negotiation; and
  • to identify ethical issues in a fact pattern where identifying such issues is part of the skillset being taught.

(c) You may not use generative AI to assist with answering questions presented in class in real time: if you are on-call that does not mean ChatGPT is on-call.

(3) You may use generative AI for research and source discovery provided you do so responsibly and in compliance with (2) above. Examples of acceptable uses include asking a generative AI tool for caselaw, statutes, and regulations relating to a particular topic, or to review a draft of your work product and ask for suggested additional sources or authorities.

(4) You may use generative AI to improve your work product, provided you do so responsibly and in compliance with (2) above. For example, you may use generative AI for brainstorming/ideation for essay topics, or to suggest a more logical structure for a paper; you may use generative AI to identify weaknesses in argument, counter-arguments you may have overlooked, and otherwise critically evaluate your written work. Likewise, you may use generative AI to improve your understanding of complex legal doctrines, including by asking for different types of explanations thereof, but again, provided you do so responsibly and in compliance with (2) above.

(5) You may use generative AI for detailed assistance with drafting, editing and style, provided you do so responsibly and in compliance with (2) above and with an appropriate disclosure. For example, you may draft a passage and then ask generative AI to rewrite it a particular style (law review, client email, opening argument), or to maintain a particular style but reduce the word count; you may draft a passage in a language other than English and then ask generative AI for an English translation; you may use generative AI to suggest more effective transitions and topic sentences, introductions and conclusions; you may use generative AI for suggestions as to how to more effectively integrate quotations into your main text.

The disclosure for the editorial assistance described above should be in the following form: “Approximately [10-25 |25-50 ] % of this [essay] was redrafted with the assistance of generative AI (list all), however all of the ideas and analysis are either my own or are appropriately cited.”

(6) You may use generative AI to generate images and charts in assessable work product with specific disclosure, such as a visible note in the caption or figure description: “Chart produced with [name of tool] based on [general description of prompt or underlying data]”.

(7) You may use spell check, and dictation software without any disclosure.

(8) You may use generative AI to support your learning and comprehension of course materials, provided you do so responsibly and in compliance with (2) above. For example, you may use generative AI as a tutor or a study partner, or to create flashcards, hypotheticals, explanations, quiz questions, etc.; you may use generative AI to summarize and outline course materials; you may use generative AI to suggest answers to non-assessable problem questions, or to evaluate your answers to non-assessable problem questions.

(9) Permitted uses are not necessarily recommended. Direct engagement with primary sources and your own analysis will yield the deepest learning and the most reliable work product. AI may serve as a useful complement—helping to clarify, organize, or refine ideas—but it should be employed thoughtfully and never as a substitute for the skills this course is designed to develop.

For term papers, you need a bit more

I suggest the following additional instructions.

Write in your own voice:

To avoid the impression that your work was written by a chatbot or is just a superficial rephrasing of a few original sources you must ensure that it reflects your own original analysis, voice, and understanding. Submissions that exhibit unusually advanced legal knowledge, overly polished or professional tone, highly structured policy-style formatting, or extensive use of comparative law without appropriate scaffolding may raise concerns about authorship. Likewise, papers that rely heavily on secondary authority without clear personal engagement can suggest inappropriate use of generative AI or outside assistance.

A good way to demonstrate the originality of your contribution is to explore a narrowly defined, non-obvious topic, rather than a broad or generalized theme arising from the course. A greater level of specificity usually indicates that a student has chosen a unique angle shaped by personal interest or experience.

Research, sources, and citation practices:

Good research and appropriate citation practices go hand in hand.

For most law research papers, you should prioritize primary sources and academic sources. However, for many topics in this course, you will be discussing recent trends and developments, so it will often be appropriate to cite journalistic reports and even blog posts as well. Here are some guidelines for citing propositions relating to Law, Opinion, Facts as summarized by someone else, and Specific facts.

(1) Law: If you are making an assertion about what the law is, you should generally cite case law, statutes, or academic treatises.

(2) Opinion: If you are discussing academic commentary or opinion, cite the relevant source directly.

(3)  Key arguments: If you are making an academic argument that already exists in the literature, you should identify who made that argument first. What if you can’t say for sure? If the argument is central to your thesis, put in the effort to be sure! If it is not, sometimes it will suffice to note others who have made the same point in a form such as “For arguments that …, see, for example, …”

(4) Facts as summarized by someone else: If you are referencing facts that have been summarized in academic commentary, you have some discretion as to whether to cite the academic source or go directly to primary sources for the underlying facts. Government reports and think tank publications are also useful for consolidated discussions of facts, as well as insightful commentary and analysis. In general, citing primary sources is preferable unless you are relying on an author’s summary or synthesis of multiple sources.

(5) Specific facts: Background information often comes from blogs, news articles, magazine articles, or even Wikipedia. That is fine. When using these as secondary sources, ask yourself: Is this the most direct source? Is this a reliable source? Whenever possible, prioritize more direct, reliable and authoritative sources to ensure accuracy and credibility. For example, do not cite to a blog post that summarizes an article in the NY Times, if you can read the underlying article and cite it directly.

Caution: AI summaries and dialogs with chatbots are not a reliable source of any external fact. Obviously, you can cite a ChatGPT session for a proposal like, “ChatGPT (version 4o) often recommends Kyoto when asked to suggest a random city.” But you can’t use ChatGPT as authority for the proposition that Kyoto was Japan’s capital from 794 to 1868.

Concluding thoughts

“Law schools are uniquely positioned to model thoughtful, principled engagement with new technology. A well-crafted AI policy can uphold academic integrity without stifling innovation or disadvantaging students. The goal is not to ban the future, but to teach students how to use it responsibly.”

Or that’s what ChatGPT said when I asked for suggestions on how conclude this post. I use LLMs in lots of different ways and this post benefited from long discussions with ChatGPT and with my Emory Law colleagues, but this post does not reflect the views of Emory Law, or ChatGPT for that matter.

Piracy, Proxies, and Performance: Rethinking Books3’s Reported Gains

A new NBER working paper by Stella Jia and Abhishek Nagaraj makes some stunning claims about the effects of pirated book corpora on large-language-model (LLM) performance. In Cloze Encounters: The Impact of Pirated Data Access on LLM Performance (May 19, 2025) (working paper)( https://www.nber.org/papers/w33598), the authors contend that access to Books3—a pirated collection of  full-text books—raises measured performance by roughly 21–23 percent in some LLMs.  

This astonishing finding is an artifact of the paper’s methodology and the very narrow definition of “performance” that it adopts, as such it should not be taken at face value. 

Cloze Encounters’ methodology and claims

Jia and Nagaraj assemble a 12,916-book evaluation set and apply a “name cloze” task: mask a named entity in a short passage and ask the model to supply it.

For instance, given a sentence like “Because you’re wrong. I don’t care what he thinks. [MASK] pulled his feet up onto the branch” from The Lightning Thief, the model should identify “Grover” as the missing name.

The main results of Cloze Encounters are estimates of “performance” showing large, statistically significant gains for GPT-class models (about 21–23 percent relative to baseline), smaller gains for Claude/Gemini/Llama-70B (about 7–9 percent), and no detectable effect for Llama-8B. The effects are stronger for less-popular book titles, consistent with fewer substitutes (Internet reviews or summaries) in other training data.

This is all well and good, but the way authors explicitly link these findings to current controversies relating to copyright policy, licensing markets, and training-data attribution is troubling.

Cloze Encounters is not measuring “performance” any way that people should care about

The first thing that raised my suspicion about this paper is that I had already seen this exact methodology used as a clever way to illustrate memorization and to show how some books are memorized more than others. See, Kent Chang et al., “Speak, Memory: An Archaeology of Books Known to ChatGPT/GPT-4” (https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.00118). Cloze Encounters scales and repurposes that approach for a causal analysis of how access to pirated books in the Books3 lead to improved LLM “performance.” But it doesn’t make sense to me that what counted as a memorization probe in one paper could just be relabeled as a general “performance” metric in another.

Why is memorization so different to performance?

This is a question of construct validity. The method in Cloze Encounters tests recall of a masked name from a short passage, scored as a binary hit. This kind of lexical recall is a narrow slice of linguistic ability that is highly sensitive to direct exposure to the source text. It’s a proxy for memorization rather than the broad competencies that make LLMs interesting and useful.

The capabilities that matter in practice—long-context understanding, abstraction and synthesis, factual grounding outside narrative domains, reliable instruction following—are largely orthogonal to masked-name recall. Calling the cloze score “LLM performance” is a massive over-generalization from a task that measures a thin, exposure-sensitive facet of behavior. As an evaluation device, name-cloze is sharp for detecting whether models learned from—or memorized—a specific source; it is blunt for assessing overall performance. There is no reason to think that evidence of snippets of memorization from particular works in the books3 dataset has any necessary relationship with being a better translator, drafter, summarizer, brainstorming partner, etc.

This paper is begging to be misread and misapplied in policy and legal debates

I wouldn’t go so far as to say that success on the cloze score tells us “literally nothing” about LLM performance: “almost nothing” is a fairer estimate. To see why, think about the process of pre-training. Pre-training optimizes next-token prediction over trillions of tokens; the cloze outcome is, by construction, and basically the same as that objective. So it is not surprising that it is unusually sensitive to direct exposure to given pieces of training data. There probably is a broad correlation between next-token  accuracy  and perceived usefulness (we certainly saw this in the transition from GPT-3.5 to GPT-4), but the relationship is not lockstep, and it’s easy to imagine a model that excels  at memorization alone but generalizes poorly.

The authors nod to these limitations at various points in the manuscript but they still frame it as a measure a  of “LLM performance” in a way that is just begging to be misread and misapplied in policy and legal debates. Abstract-level claims travel further than caveats; many readers will see the former and miss the latter.

Nor does the identification strategy employed in the paper do anything to rescue the limits of the construct. The instrumental variable—publication-year share in Books3—may isolate an exogenous shock to exposure. Even granting the exclusion restriction, the estimate remains the effect of Books3 on a name-cloze score. It tells us little about summarization, reasoning, instruction following, safety behavior, or cross-domain generalization.

Bottom line

Cloze Encounters usefully documents that access to Books3 leaves a measurable imprint on exposure-sensitive recall. But its central metric does not justify broad the claims it makes about “LLM performance.” The study measures whether models can fill in masked strings drawn from particular books; it does not show that such access improves the flexible, user-tailored generation that makes these systems valuable.